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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Spanish annual rate of (CPI) inflation has come down from 24.6% in 1997 
to 2.5% nowadays. However, the big blot is still unemployment, now slightly down 
at just under 22% (the largest among DECD countries). From 1977 to 1989, the 
unemployment rate jumped from 5.1 % to 17.2%. Throughout the 1990s it has 
averaged 20.1 % with a maximum of 24.6% in the first quarter of 1994. The fact that 
the unemployment rate is currently close to what the inflation rate was in 1977 and, 
conversely, that the inflation rate is only slightly below the unemployment rate in the 
mid-1970s may look at first sight as if the unemployment-inflation trade~fT is close 
to 1: I. In this paper we tackle this issue in greater depth. 
Disentangling the sacrifice ratios implied by those figures is a key issue for 
judging the performance of the Spanish economy over the last two decades. A 
possible interpretation of the above mentioned episodes could be a keynesian one 
under which, contractionary aggregate demand policies are a major cause of the high 
unemployment rate which, in turn, leads to a fall in inflation. Moreover, in the 
presence of important hysteretic mechanisms, the trade-off between unemployment 
and inflation could be a permanent one.(1) Alternative interpretations are related, on 
the one hand, to the important role played by expectations and credibility-related 
phenomena (neoclassical-monetarist-rational expectations models) and, on the other 
hand, to the predominant role played by structural supply-side shocks (real business 
cycle models); allowing for the latter may even imply the absence of long-run and 
even short-run trade-offs (see Sargent, 1982). 
Naturally, these alternative views imply: (i) different roles for the economIc 
shocks leading the sources of business cycle fluctuations and stochastic growth; (ii) 
different roles for the propagation mechanisms of those shocks; and, (iii) drastic 
differences for economic policy design. These simple and well-known ideas pose 
difficulties for the researcher in answering the following relevant questions: How 
convincing is the identification of demand/supply shocks within this unemployment-
inflation framework?; How can we measure the costs of disinflation?; How does this 
(\) Hysteresis in Spain is related to the existence of high firing costs and long 
unemployment benefit duration. See, e.g., Bentolila and Dolado (1994), Dolado and 
L6pez-Salido (l996) and Dolado and Jimeno (1997). 
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depend upon high persistence in both unemployment and inflation?; and finally, How 
does the sacrifice ratio change across the identification schemes and over time? 
The goal of this paper is to deal with those issues through the analysis of the joint 
dynamic behaviour of inflation and unemployment in Spain over the period 
1964-1995. Our approach will consist of modelling a Vector Autoregression (V AR) 
in both variables, conditioning on other exogenous variables, and imposing several 
identifying restrictions on the V AR innovations in order to recover demand and 
supply shocks. After all, the idea behind the unemployment-inflation trade-off and 
the sacrifice ratio is to analyse the dynamic responses of both variables to a demand 
shock, hence the importance of distinguishing between them. 
Specifically, our approach will be based upon the Structural Vector 
Autoregression (SV AR) methodology, following an earlier paper by King and 
Watson (1994). We do this for two reasons. First, because until the beginning of the 
1990s, most of the research on the unemployment-inflation trade-off was based upon 
the estimation of quasi-structural equations relating wage/price-inflation and the 
unemployment rate, i.e., the so-called Phillips curve approach (see, e.g., Gordon, 
1970) where many of the relevant variables were treated as exogenous and where 
dubious identification restrictions and measurement problems abounded (see 
Manning, 1993). And, secondly, because it allows us to gauge how robust some of 
the results obtained with the previous approach are, under the competing SV AR 
methodology. Furthennore, as above mentioned, by using the SV AR methodology 
to map reduced fonn innovations onto shocks, we will be able to pose a well defined 
question, namely, What effects will demand shocks have on the levels of inflation 
and unemployment? and, therefore, What trade-offs and sacrifice ratios are implied? 
Following King and Watson (1994) we will be eclectic in the choice of 
identification schemes which pennit to uncover the shocks. In particular, we will 
choose three identification outlines which give rise to the same reduced fonn and, 
in this sense, they fit the data equally well. Yet, they have substantially different 
implications for the trade-off between unemployment and inflation, and for the 
interpretation of particular historical episodes. Specifically, we use three strategies: 
i) a real business-cycle, ii) a monetarist, and iii) a keynesian outline, respectively. 
By presenting a menu of results based on the different schemes we can examine the 
robustness of the results according to the different interpretations, and check which 
one seems more plausible according to prior beliefs. 
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At this stage, it is important to remark that we introduce several modifications to 
the King and Watson (1994), methodology. First, we add some exogenous variables 
supposedly capturing some further supply shocks. Second, we modify their 
"keynesian" and "monetarist" identification strategies by choosing outlines in which 
the short-run impact of demand shocks on unemployment is maximized, under the 
first case, and where inflation is completely dominated by dema:1d shocks in the 
long-run, under the second case. We believe that both modifications lead to neater 
interpretations of the underlying conceptual outlines. And, finally, we check the 
robustness of the results in the bivariate SV AR by adding a third variable to the 
V AR which enables to separate monetary from fiscal shocks within the demand class 
of shocks. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin in Section 2 by 
discussing the identification issues related to a bivariate V AR of inflation and 
unemployment and the possible identification outlines considered in the paper. In 
Section 3, we discuss the properties of the data and report the empirical results. In 
Section 4, we consider the issues related to the subsample stability of our estimates 
and the plausibility of the outlines to explain significant disinflationary periods in the 
recent history of Spain. In Section 5, we address the robustness of some key 
parameter estimates to changes in the identifying restrictions. Finally, in Section 6, 
some conclusions are drawn. 
2. ECONOMIC AND ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
2.1. Structural V AR Representation and the Identification Problem 
Let us assume that the Phillips curve takes the following structural representation: 
p p 
flu, = I..flTt, +2: uttnjflTt,_j+ 2: U,ltIj flll,-j + e; (1) 
j=1 j=1 
where I.. indicates the contemporaneous effect of changes in the inflation rate (!lrr) 
on the unemployment rate changes (flu), and e; is a structural shock, which will 
be defined below. 
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This expression is not the usual one found in the empirical analysis of the Phillips 
curve. The differences can be stated as follows. First, unemployment appears in the 
LHS on (1) rather than in the RHS and, conversely happens with inflation; the 
reason is that, following King and Watson (1994), we define the Phillips trade-off 
as, the ratio of the change in unemployment rate to the change in inflation rate, 
i.e.( all/art ). This is the inverse of the traditional measure (see, e.g. Gordon, 1990, 
and the references therein), and it will be useful because the hypothesis of absence 
of trade-off corresponds to a zero value for this expression, instead of _00. Second, 
we represent the relationship in first differences, rather than in levels, accounting for 
the importance of both hysteresis mechanisms in the unemployment rate and high 
persistence in the inflation rate. Both stochastic properties are well documented 
elsewhere and can be taken as "stylized facts" of the Spanish economy over the 
sample period used in this paperY) 
In order to close the model, we next consider the demand side of the economy, 
represented through the following equation: 
p p 
!lrr.1 = 8 !luI + L U""j !lrr./_j + L uTU1j !1ur_j + E~ (2) 
j=1 j=1 
where the parameter 8 reflects the contemporaneous effect of changes in 
unemployment on the inflation changes, and e~ is another structural shock which 
again is yet to be defined. 
Whether the system (I) - (2) is an adequate representation of the supply and 
demand sides of the economy is a debatable issue. To shed some light on our chosen 
interpretation, we first summarize the key points somehow heuristically; and, next, 
we will proceed to formalize those ideas, rearranging (l) and (2) in a more familiar 
SVAR context. 
Let us start by interpreting equation (I). It can be obtained from standard price-
setting and a wage-setting equations given by 
121 See, for instance, Dolado and L6pez-Salido (1996) and Andres (1991) where 
a b,attery of unit root tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in both 
senes. 
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P = A -1(1 +1l)W (3) 
W = p 'A F(u u z) , -\' (4) 
where P = price level, W = nominal wage, pc = expected price level; 11 =: price-cost 
mark-up, z = wage pressure (aggregate supply) variables, A = productivity. 
Equation (3) corresponds to non-competitive price setting under a constant-retum-to-
scale production function and (4) is the typical wage-setting relation underlying 
many theories of wage determination,~here the presence of U.I allows for hysteretic 
mechanisms.") Substituting (4) in to (3), and log-linearizing yields. 
(5) 
Next, we assume that n; = 7tt-\' ; that there IS full hysteresis, so 
that ~Ill - ~2/(-1 is proportional to au; that the marlfllp 11 is constant; and that z is 
a process governed by the innovation ES • Then, inverting equation (5) with u as the 
dependent variable yields an equation similar to (I). As regards equation (2), the 
easiest way to interpret it is as an aggregate demand equation where output growth 
(ay) is just a function of the acceleration of real money balances.(4) Using Okun's 
law to convert ay into au, and assuming that the innovation to a 2m is Ed yields an 
equation that, when inverted, is similar to (2). 
If, as is a standard practice in the literature on SVAR (see Blanchard and Quah, 
1989), it is assumed that Ed and ES are independent LLd. processes, the system 
formed by (I) and (2) is not identified unless one further restriction is imposed. To 
deal more formally with the identification problem, we use the stacked SV AR 
form:(~l 
(11 See, e.g., Layard, Nickell and lackman (1991) for a good review of hysteresis 
models. 
(4) The possibility of extending this set of arguments is discussed in Section 5. 
(~) Notice that we write down the model in first differences, so that both ~ and 
7t1 are assumed to I( I) and not cointegrated. See Section 3 for further details. 
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a(L)X, = ~ + £, 
p 
a(L) ='L ajLj 
j.(J 
X, =(au, , a1t,)' ; 
_(.f d), £,- £,,£, 
where ~ is a vector of detenninistic tenns, and: 
= [I -Al. = [aIm, am,,] 
ao ' a. , ~ I J a a 
rut rut , , 
j=I, ... ,p 
(6) 
As noted earlier, we interpret equation (I) as the Phillips curve. Correspondingly, the 
structural disturbance e~ in expression (1) corresponds to a supp~v shock. 
Conversely, the structural error telm £~ in (2) is interpreted as a demand shock. We 
will assume that shocks are mutually uncorrelated, <J 12=0, so that any 
contemporaneous correlation between 1tt and ~ arises from nonzero values of the 
parameters i.. and 8. This framework will allow us to address a number of relevant 
Issues: 
(i) the estimation of the short- and long-run effects of both demand and supply 
shocks on unemployment and inflation, since the specification in first differences 
implies that shocks potentially have long-lasting effects. 
(ii) the estimation of the Phillips curve trade-off (PTO, henceforth), namely, the 
inverse of the slope of the Phillips Curve-. This concept traces out the relative 
dynamic effects of demand shocks on unemployment and inflation. Fonnally, it can 
be computed as: 
d Ou,ja£, 
PTO = __ ~ ; k = 0,1, ... ,00 
arr,jae~ 
(7) 
(iii) tests for both long and short-run neutrality; i.e, the verticality of the long and 
short-run Phillips curve. These hypotheses hold when expression (7) is zero for 
k = ° and k .... 00, respectively. 
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From the previous discussion, it is clear that the structural model given by the 
SVAR system in (6) is not identified. To see this consider the equivalent reduced 
form V AR derived from the model:(6l 
AUt = aCL) AUt_I + h(L) A1tt-\ + e,tI (8a) 
(8b) 
or in stacked form: 
reL)X, = et (9) 
where e = (e e)' is a vector of zero-mean identically distributed 
I ut TtI 
innovations; nn=!-r/ - r2 L 2 - ... - r" L" is an autorregressive polynomial 
lag matrix with all its roots outside the unit circle; and, E(elel')=L=[ <Vij] is the 
variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals. 
Comparing (6) and (9), the following relationships 
hold: r. = -ao-
I 
a., and e =-aO-
1 
e. Thus, the matrices a" and the variance 
, I t t 
covariance matrix of the structural shocks, n , are determined by the following set 
of equations: 
-I 
-ao aj = rj ,i= I, ... ,p (10) 
-In( -I), _ ~ ao :loo/. ao - ~ (11) 
The identification problem can be stated as follows. The first set of equations linking 
the variance of el and et imposes no restrictions on ao. That is, there are no 
restrictions on the coefficients on lags entering equation (6). Thus, equation (11) 
determines the unknowns in both Un and n as a function of the variance-covariance 
matrix of the reduced form innovations. Yet, since L is a 2 x 2 symmetric matrix, 
only three unknown parameters can be identified in ao and n. Hence, even after 
assuming that (J12=O, the four parameters (JII' (J22' i.. and 0 cannot be identified, and 
one additional restriction is required. 
((,) Notice that, for simplicity, deterministic terms have been omitted from the 
formulae. 
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Nevertheless, by adding whatever single restriction one should wish, all the 
resulting models are just-identified and, hence, their unrestricted reduced forms fit 
the data equally well. Notwithstanding, each one will have different implications for 
disentangling: i) the sources of business cycle fluctuations and stochastic trends; ii) 
the trade-off between unemployment and inflation; and, iii) the policy interpretations 
'Jf particular historical episodes. In this respect, the following section explores three 
alternative identifying restrictions which seem to us especially meaningful from an 
economic point of view. The three schemes share the orthogonality assumption, 
er 12=0, and none of them imposes long-run verticality of the Phillips curve, since this 
is one of the propositions we wish to test. 
2.2. Three Alternative Identification Schemes 
A simple comparison of expressions (6) and (9) implies that the innovations of 
the reduced form, e and e ,can be expressed as linear combinations of the 
ul 1t1 
structural shocks. In particular, simple derivations lead to the following 
relationships: e", = f)(i...e; + e;) and e", = f)(e; + 8 e;) ,with f) = (I - i...8) -I . 
Using these relationships and the V AR reduced form (expressions (8a) and (8b» 
a closed-form solution for the long-run PTO (expression (7» can be calculated:(7) 
= (1-d(l))i...+b(l) = a",,(I) 
(1 -a(l» +AC(l ) a"" (l) (12) 
Thus, the long-run PTO is a function of the short-run PTO (i...) and the long-run 
relationships between unemployment and inflation (the lag-polynomials of the 
reduced form VAR evaluated at L=I). Notice also that if c(l )<0, the long-run PTO 
does not have any discontinuity for j.,<0, since the denominator in expression (12) 
will always be positive, assuming O<a(l )<1. 
As noted earlier, to just-identify the model we can use both the short-run and long-
run restrictions implied by alternative economic models. In particular, in this section 
1.7\ To .obtain this we solve (8a) and (8b) for the long-run trends in unemployment 
and mflatlon. 
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we discuss three different sets of identifying restrictions based upon: (i) a real 
business cycle approach, (ii) a rational expectations-monetarist approach, and (iii) 
a keynesian approach, respectively. 
2.2.1. A Real Business Cycle Approach (RBC) 
From this standpoint, real variables, such as the unemployment rate, are not affected 
by nominal shocks. That is eu,=es, and, hence, identification is achieved by setting 
>"=0, i.e. the short-run trade-off is zero. This restriction has been recently used by 
King and Watson (1994) as an interpretation of the RBC characteristics. Notice that 
it does not imply that the long-run Phillips trade-off is zero since, as can be seen 
from expression (l2), the latter will only be the case if b(l )=0. Hence, the existence 
of long-run Granger-causality from inflation to unemployment in the V AR is crucial 
for the existence of a long-run PTO in this case. 
2.2.2. A Monetarist Approach (M) 
From this viewpoint, there is no long-run impact of supply shocks on the level 
of inflation, i.e., inflation is a demand (monetary) phenomenon in the long-run, i.e. 
a,,,,(L)=O in (6). It is easy to check that this restriction implies D = -c(I)/l-a(I), 
which, together with>.. = (W 12-DW ll ) I (W 22-8w I2 ) obtained from (11), defines a 
corresponding value for i... 
This identification assumption is similar in spirit to that used in Roberts (1993) 
in identifying "core inflation". King and Watson (1994), in turn, use a so-called 
Rational Expectations-Monetarist identification whereby an implicit value of i.. is 
estimated as cov (u,ni) Icov (p,ni) where In stands for unanticipated money (see 
Barro and Rush, 1980). Since the validity of the hypothesis that only unanticipated 
money matters in dubious for the Spanish economy (see Dolado, 1984) we rather 
prefer the one chosen here. Notice that, in this case, the PTO will only be zero if 
i..=b( I }/I-d( I). 
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2.2.3. A Keynesian Approach (K) 
The keynesian view implies that short-run (one-quarter) unemployment 
fluctuations are completely dominated by demand shocks, whereas in the long-run 
both types of shock are allowed to affect unemployment in a possibly pennanent 
wa~'. This implies a choice of A such that it maximises the ratio i../l-Ao (see the 
relation between ell and eO) subject to 0= (W 12 - A ( 22) / (w 11- AW 12)' This procedure 
differs from the one chosen by King and Watson (1994) who implicitly define A by 
using the contemporaneous value of U, as an instrument to estimate (1) or 
equivalently, estimating (l) by OLS using the reverse regression of ~ onto U, and 
relevant lags, as performed by Gordon (1970) and other researchers in the Keynesian 
tradition. Again, we believe that our identification outline is neater. 
2.3. The Lucas-Sargent Critique 
In this section we just want to point out briefly that the fact that we cannot reject 
a unit root in the inflation process over the sample period saves the analysis from 
the traditional Lucas-Sargent criticism. The critique runs as follows. Suppose that 
unemployment is simply a function of unexpected inflation as in Lucas (l972a,b) and 
that this hypothesis is tested in the following expectations-augmented version of (8a) 
11, = )w1t, - ). '1t~ + fl, (13) 
where 1t°1 = E1_t(1t1), and the natural rate hypothesis implies that ).=).'. 
Assume that 1t1 is governed by the process 1t, = pp.)1t,_t +P2(L)u,_t +E" where, 
without affecting the basic result, the contemporaneous value of Ut has been 
excluded. Then, under rational expectations, 1t; = pp.)1t,_\ +P2(L)II,_\. Thus, the 
reduced for unemployment and inflation relation is given by 
(14) 
so that the long-run trade-off is au/an = ().-A·p l(1))/(l +).·p 2(1» . Hence, even if 
there is long-run neutrality (A=)."), estimation of (14) would lead to an apparent 
long-run trade-off unless p\( I) =1. Naturally, the existence of a unit root in 1tt 
implies precisely that the condition pt(l) =1 holds and, therefore, the criticism does 
not apply in our case. 
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3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.1. The data set and reduced-form estimates 
The data set spans the period 1964: 1-1995:4 and consists of: the Spanish CPI 
annual inflation rate (1tI=A4 In PI)' the Spanish unemployment rate(~), the EU(IS) 
CPI annual inflation rate (1tI ' = A4 In Pit) and the EU(15) unemployment rate (~'). 
All data are quarterly, seasonally unadjusted and are drawn from the Statistical 
Bulletin of the iJanco de E\pafia and OECD Economic Outlook (various issues). 
Figure I depicts the evolution of the Spanish unemployment and inflation rates 
over the sample period. Both series move together up to the late 1970s, reflecting 
the stagflationary period that followed the oil price crises. Later, their correlation 
becomes negative, with the exception of the 1986-91 subperiod where seemingly no 
correlation is present. Nevertheless, as these simple movements are dominated by 
both domestic and foreign demand and supply shocks, they are not informative about 
their driving forces. To disentangle the source of those correlations and analyze the 
PTOs following a demand shock is the task of the rest of the paper. 
Table I shows a summary of results from the estimation of the VAR with lag 
length ranging from 4 to 8 quarters. The V AR in (A ul , A 1t1)', given by equations (8a) 
and (8b), was augmented with a constant term, three seasonal dummies, current and 
lagged values of A u.· and lagged values of A 1t.', accounting for external shocks 
leading to shifts in the aggregate demand relations and the Phillips Curve. Both AUI ' 
and Art.' are treated as exogenous, given the small-open economy assumption. In this 
respect, two comments are in order. First, the current value A1tI' has been excluded 
since including it seems to run directly against the spirit of the RBC identification 
strategy. Indeed, including the current value or the first lag leaves the results almost 
unchanged. Secondly, reparameterizing the long-run solution of the V AR in terms 
of inflation and unemployment differentials cannot be rejected at standard confidence 
levels. Thus, the structural shocks €Id and €/ can be interpreted as idiosyncratic 
national .\'ltPp~V and demand shocks though, for the sake of brevity, we will stick to 
the labels in section 2. And third, the foreign variables have also been introduced to 
help explaining a possible structural break in the late seventies. In this respect, we 
also introduced some oil-price series and some (foreign) labour-market variables 
(such as replacement ratios) directly, but they did not prove to be significant. 
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It should also be noticed that there are no signs of cointegration among any of the 
series and, thus, that the specification of the V AR in first-differences seems 
appropriate. IK ) Furthermore, according to various portmanteau test on serial 
correlation and tests on ARCH in the error terms, reported in Table 1, there is no 
sign of misspecification in the VAR. As for the choice of the VAR lag length, both 
AIC and SBIC criteria point out to 5 and 4 lags, respectively. Nevertheless, results 
for lag length ranging from 4 to 8 are also reported in Table I to highlight their 
robustness for such a choice. 
Various implications follow from the above results. First, the correlation between 
the VAR innovations (e" and e,.) is small, implying that A~-8(a)\1/(a)'2' Secondly, the 
estimates of b( I ) and d( I ) are found to be small and non-significant; that b( I) is non 
significant implies that there is no Granger-causality from inflation to unemployment 
(given foreign inflation and foreign unemployment). Thirdly, the estimates of a( 1) 
and c( I) are more sizeable and significant, albeit the second is marginally so; that 
c( I) is significant and negative implies that there is Granger-causality from 
unemployment to inflation. And finally, since O<a(l )<1 and c(1 )<0, it follows from 
expression (12) in section 2 that the long-run PTO is a monotonic function for 
negative values of A. Figure 2 depicts the estimated long-run trade-offs as a function 
of A for the various lag lengths reported in Table 1. It can be observed that, for 
small values of A, the PTO is almost nil whilst, for high values, it is around -2.0. 
The choice of lag length, in turn, does not seem to have any noticeable effect on 
these estimates. 
3.2. Impulse Response Functions and Variance Decompositions 
Let us now turn to the results under the different identification schemes. We begin 
the discussion with the keynesian (K) identifying restriction. Using the procedure 
described in section 2.2.3, A=-0.25 proved to maximise the short-run demand effects 
on unemployment. Figure 3a depicts the impulse-response (IR) functions of 
unemployment and inflation to a unit demand shock whereas the bottom panel 
• (x) Co~ditioning on AUt', and A1tt_,', Johansen's maximum eigenvalue test for 
comtegratlOn between Ut and 1t( yields 9.33 (for r=0) and 5.36 (for r=1) where r is 
the cointegration rank. The critical values are 14.90 and 8.18, respetively. 
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depicts the Phillips trade70ff for various horizons; the short-run trade-off is -0.3 
whilst the long-run trade-off, which is achieved after four years, is -0.6. 
As regards the M identifying restriction, }"=-0.12 turned out to be the value 
obtained from the procedure described in section 2.2.2. Figure 3b shows the same 
information as above. Since inflation is a monetary phenomenon in the long-run 
under this scheme, its IR function converges quickly towards unity, whereas 
unemployment falls by 0.3 percentage points in the long-run. The PTO is -0.12 in 
the short run and, after two years, reaches a steady state value of -0.3. Both 
trade-offs are smaller (in absolute value) than under the K scheme, but they turn out 
to be statistically different from zero. 
Next, we turn to the RBC scheme. Since b( I) =d( I ) ~ 0, the RBC implies a 
vertical long-run Phillips curve. Figure 3c shows a similar IR function for inflation 
to the one obtained under the M scheme. Naturally, what differs is the shape of the 
unemployment IR function which, under the RBC assumption, implies an almost zero 
trade-off at all horizons. 
Table 2 summarises the importance of demand shocks in explaining the variability 
of forecast errors of inflation and unemployment at various horizons, by means of 
the forecast error-variance decomposition (VD) method. Under the K scheme, 
demand shocks explain 100% of unemployment variability, reflecting that inflation 
does not Granger-cause unemployment, and only 12% of inflation variability (the 
remaining proportions are explained by supply shocks). As expected, under the M 
scheme, E'\ explains 15% of the unemployment variability and almost 90% of 
inflation variability. Finally, under the RBC scheme, unemployment variability is 
completely explained by E; , whereas 93% of inflation variability is explained in 
the short-run and almost 60% in the long-run by those shocks. 
3.3. Sacrifice Ratios 
Once we have examined the different trade-offs implied by the various 
identification outlines, we turn to an alternative measure of the cost of disinflation. 
Table 3 shows the estimated dynamic responses of the levels of unemployment and 
inflation to an E~ shock that eventually leads to a 1 % permanent reduction in 
inflation. In addition, the table shows the sacrifice ratio defined as the sum over a 
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number of years of the incremental annual levels of unemployment following the 
demand shock; i.e, the sum over the period of the differences in the annual levels 
of unemployment with and without the demand shock. Under a stable Okun's law, 
these sacrifice rates' would be proportional to the cumulated loss in output over the 
relevant horizon. 
The K identification suggests that the unemployment rate raises by 0.35% after 
one year, is 0.5% higher after two years, and around 0.6% higher after five years. 
By contrast, the M identification yields smaller unemployment responses: 0.18% 
after a year and 0.30% after the five years. Finally, under the RBC identification, 
unemployment is governed essentially by supply shocks, so that the reduction in 
inflation has costs in terms of unemployment which are negligible at all horizons. 
The resulting sacrifice ratios over five years are, respectively, 2.5%, 1.3% or 0%. 
Following the results obtained by Dolado and L6pez-Salido (1996) about the 
dynamic interaction between unemployment and output in a similar full hysteresis 
framework, we can compute the corresponding cumulated output losses over any 
period. According to their estimates, the Okun's coefficient for the Spanish economy 
is around 2 over the sample 1970-1994. Consequently, the cumulated loss in output 
over the five-year horizon could be estimated around 5%, 2.5% or 0%, depending 
on the specific identification outline. 
4. SUBSAMPLE STABILITY AND TWO DISINFLATIONARY PERIODS 
In this section we investigate the stability of the bivariate relation analyzed above. 
We began this paper by pinpointing that the late 1970s represented key years in the 
recent history of Spanish inflation. Thus, it seems natural to test whether that period 
is the natural breaking date in the sample. In particular, using 1979: 1 as the breaking 
point (the most likely date for a break according to recursive estimation), split-
sample Chow tests for a VAR(4) yield F(l4,IOO)=1.58 for (8a) and F(l4, 1 00)=1.83 
for (8b). The p-values of both tests are only slightly above 5%, indicating some sig~s 
of lack of parameter constancy. Moreover, the long-run PTO was marginally 
insignificant during the first subsample, a period which was dominated by supply 
shocks. 
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However, when the VAR was re-estimated in the sample 1979:2 - 1995:4, the 
results were very similar to those obtained for the whole sample, as shown in Figure 
4 which compares the PTOs (across different values of A) for the complete sample 
and the chosen subsample. As regards the VD analysis, not reported for the sake of 
brevity, the results were again similar to those shown in Table 2. Finally, with regard 
to the sacrifice ratios, the results were almost identical for the RBC and M outlines, 
while the one implied by the K identification was only half of a percentage point 
lower in the subsample. 
So far we have discussed the three alternative identification schemes on equal 
grounds. After all, their reduced forms are identical. Are there any grounds to 
choosing a particular one on the basis of extraneous information to the model? In 
this respect, we use information on three recent disinflationary periods to evaluate 
the identification schemes. The first one goes from 1987: I to 1988: 1 and was 
dominated by tighter monetary policy with interest rates raising by 5 p.p. in a single 
year. The second one runs from 1989:3 to 1991:3 and, while interest rates remained 
high and stable around 15%, it was accompanied by tight credit restrictions. So, both 
dissinflationary periods seem to follow a monetary contraction. Conversely, the 
available evidence about the third dissinflationary period, which covers 1992: I to 
1993: I, points out to the effects of deregulation in labour and goods markets as the 
major causes behind the fall in inflation (see Dolado and Jimeno, 1997). 
Accordingly, we expect the first two periods to be dominated by demand shocks, 
whilst the last one should be explained by supply shocks. 
Using the VD results for the above mentioned episodes we found that according 
to the M scheme the contribution of demand shocks to the variance of !l.n during the 
first two subperiods was above 90%, while in the third episode it was only 20%. 
The K outline, in turn, explains that more than 70% of the variability is due to 
demand shocks in all three episodes, whereas according to the RBC scheme, it is 
always below 5%. Thus, according to our prior beliefs on the distribution of shocks 
in each period, our hunch is that of the three cases considered above, the monetarist 
one is closest to the real workings of the Spanish economy. 
Finally, in order to check the robustness of our results, we report in Figure 5, for 
a wide range of values for A, the resulting point estimates and confidence intervals 
for the long-run PTO, showing what values of A are compatible with the hypothesis 
of a vertical long-run Phillips curve. For A<-1.27, the estimated long-run PTO are 
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large, though non significant. However, for -1.27<}"<-O.09, a range which includes 
two of the three previous outlines, the hypothesis is rejected, unless prior beliefs 
close to the RBC outline are assumed. Thus, the evidence points out that even under 
the M scheme (}..=-O.l2) the rise in unemployment/output loss, due to a disinflation 
led by negative demand shocks, seems to be permanent, a result which is line with 
the. strong available evidence pointing out that the staggering rise in Spanish 
unemployment has a strong hysteresis component (see, e.g., Blanchard and Jimeno, 
1995). 
5. ROBUSTNESS OF THE RESULTS TO A TRIV ARIA TE V AR 
So far, we have relied upon the assumption that there are only two important 
shocks which can be identified from the bivariate VAR in equation (1 )-(2). A 
controversial implication of our results is that there seems to be a permanent PTO 
even under the sensible monetarist assumption that inflation is a purely monetary 
phenomenon in the long-run. Therefore, it is important to explore whether this result 
is robust or not to changes in the specification of the model. 
As pointed out by Evans (1994), suppose there is a third shock; then the identified 
supply and demand shocks from the bivariate V AR will be a linear combination of 
the three shocks. In particular, what this model identifies as a demand shock is not 
necessarily a (nominal) monetary shock but a mixture of the latter and possibly a 
fiscal shock. After all, the underlying theory behind equation (2) is that of an 
aggregate demand equation where output depends on real money balances, 
government expenditure and taxes. For simplicity the last two variables where 
ignored in our earlier discussion. Yet, they could be important. Hence, in our 
bivariate framework we are just able to identify pooled demand shocks. Thus, to 
disentangle a pure "monetary" shock, one possibility is to add a third variable (~) 
to the V AR which contains information about "non-monetary" shocks so that e~ can 
be interpreted appropriately. Empirically, this is done by adding lagged values of ~ 
to the VAR in (8a)-(8b), allowing ~ to be influenced by contemporaneous values of 
a UI and a ITI in its own equation (i.e., the original demand and supply shocks are 
treated as Wold causally prior to the third shock). We considered various candidates 
for XI and found logged government current expenditure (in second differences) as 
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a suitable one.(9) In Table 4 we report the corresponding sacrifice ratio, that is a 
cumulative transitory increase of the unemployment rate of between 2.5 to 3.25 p.p. 
per I p.p. of inflation reduction, which in terms of lost output is equivalent to 5 to 
6.5 percent of GDP. 
While the new results arising from attempting to distinguish between monetary 
and non-monetary shocks yield different implications regarding whether a long-run 
PTO exists, it is interesting to note that they turn out to be not that different when 
comparing the costs and benefits of achieving lower inflation. In particular, as 
claimed by Feldstein (1996), if the benefits of lower inflation measured in terms of 
GDP gains are permanent, via lower distortions stemming from the interaction of 
inflation and taxes, then, discounting an annual benefit of x percent of GDP at a 
discount rate of p in an economy that has a normal growth rate of 2.5% a year (the 
Spanish normal rate over the sample period), yields a present value of x/(p-0.025). 
If the costs in terms of output are permanent as in the bivariate system, then 
disinflation of I p.p. will be worthy enterprise if x>c, where c is the annual loss of 
GDP; on the other hand, if they are transitory, as in the trivariate system, then the 
required condition is x>c( p-0.025), where c is the cumulated output loss. According 
to the monetarist model, using an Okun's coefficient of 2.0 and a discount rate of 
9,5% (see Dolado et aI., 1997)(\°1, the threshold value in the first case of GDP is 
0.52% of GDP per year (obtained, following Table 2, as 2 times 1.3, divid~d by 5, 
since the sacrifice ratio is computed every 5 years) whereas in the second case is 
between 0.35% to 0.46% (0.07 times 5 or 6.5%, respectively), not such a different 
figure. 
Finally, we would like to comment briefly on how our results, based upon the 
SV AR methodology, compare to the more traditional ones obtained under the 
estimation of a simultaneous equations model. In this respect, Andres et al. (1996) 
make use of a small quarterly macroeconometric model to compute the sacrifice ratio 
of permanently reducing inflation in Spain by I p.p. They conclude that these costs 
are about 0.45% of GDP per year on a permanent basis, which is very similar to 
what we find in the monetarist case. Equally, Ball (1996) suggests that a permanent 
(9) Using alternative variables of fiscal impulse, like the cyclical adjusted deficit, 
yielded similar results. 
nO) The discount rate corresponds to the average real net return on the Madrid 
Stock Exchange Index during 1985-1995. 
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reduction in inflation of I p.p. comes with a permanent annual output loss of about 
0.55% of GDP, a figure again remarkably close to the 0.52% estimated for the 
monetarist case. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we study the joint dynamic behaviour of inflation and 
unemployment in the Spanish economy over the period 1964-1995, with the aim of 
documenting the existing trade-offs between both variables at high and low 
frequencies, and over several subperiods. We proceed in the style of King and 
Watson (1994). who used structural V AR techniques to undertake an identification 
of the Phillips curve system. We have used, in particular, three identification 
schemes which fit the data equally well, but that have different implications for the 
magnitude of Phillips trade-offs and for sacrifice ratios. A key assumption in our 
analysis is that both unemployment and inflation can be described as first-order 
integrated processes -le 1)- for the sample period, therefore avoiding the Lucas-
Sargent critique about the econometric estimation of "spurious" trade-offs (Lucas and 
Sargent (1979). 
As regards the different identification outlines, the following results stand out. A 
traditional keynesian scheme yields: (i) a large estimated long-run trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment of around -0.6; (ii) the short-run (one year) and long-run 
variability of unemployment is almost completely explained by demand shocks 
which, in turn, only explain 12% of the variability of inflation at all frequencies; and 
(iii) the sacrifice ratio over five years is estimated to be a cumulative rise of 2.5 p.p. 
in unemployment for a permanent disinflation of I p.p. By contrast, a monetarist 
interpretation yields: (i) a long-run trade-off of -0.3, half of that estimated under the 
keynesian scheme; (ii) demand shocks explain almost 90% of inflation variability 
and 15% of unemployment variability; and (iii) a sacrifice ratio of 1.3 over five 
years. Finally, an alternative real business-cycle outline yields: (i) negligible trade-
off; (ii) unemployment variability is almost fully explained by supply shocks whereas 
90% of inflation variability in the short-run, and 60% in the long-run, is due to 
demand shocks. 
With regard to the analysis of different subsamples, we find that the results for 
the total sample are seemingly dominated by the behaviour during the 1979-1996 
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subsample, whereas the shifts in the Phillips curve before the end of the 1970s were 
dominated by supply shocks. 
Next, on the basis of extraneous infonnation, we analyze the contribution of 
demand and supply shocks to the variability of inflation and unemployment over 
significant episodes in the recent disinflationary period in Spain, finding that the 
monetarist scheme fits better with prior beliefs. 
Finally, several robustness exercises have been undertaken. In particular, 
augmenting the bivariate VAR with a third variable (public expenditure) in order to 
disentangle monetary from "non-monetary" shocks indicate that the unemployment-
inflation trade-ofT may be transifOlY rather than permanent, in spite of the high 
degree of hysteresis in the Spanish labour market. Nonetheless, the benefits 
stemming from lower inflation, needed to overcome the estimated costs, are similar 
in both cases. 
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Choice of lag 
VAR lenght Criteria 
lag lenght AlC SBIC a(l) 
4 3.623 -1.348 0.66 
(0.10) 
5 3.619 -1.254 0.62 
(0.11) 
6 3.653 -1.119 0.57 
(0.11 ) 
7 3.710 -0.963 0.57 
(0.11) 
8 3.761 -0.810 0.543 
(0.12) 
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF REDUCED FORM VARS 
(1964-1995) 
D..U t = a(L) D..U t - 1 + b(L) D..1t t - 1 +eut 
D..1t t = c(L) D..u t - 1 + d(L) D..1t t - 1 + e1tt 
Sum of the Coefficients Residual Covariance Matrix 
b(1) c(1) d(1) sd(eu) sd(e lt) corr(.) 
0.01 -0.41 -0.09 0.29 0.98 -0.041 
(0.04) (0.24) (0.14) 
0.01 -0.24 0.136 0.30 1.03 -0.049 
(0.05) (0.15) (0.16) 
-0.001 -0.29 0.126 0.30 1.05 -0.055 
(0.05) (0.17) (0.19) 
0.002 -0.34 0.012 0.30 1.05 -0.055 
(0.06) (0.19) (0.20) 
0.003 -0.42 -0.15 0.31 1.05 -0.058 
(0.07) (0.21 ) (0.23) 
Tests on Residuals 
BL(8) ARCH(4) 
0.40 13.3 1.33 3.55 
(0.49) (0.11) (0.86) (0.47) 
1.03 12.4 1.32 3.46 
(0.85) (0.15) (0.87) (0.43) 
1.01 12.6 1.03 3.35 
(0.84) (0.14) (0.80) (0.40) 
2.06 12.4 1.16 3.33 
(0.75) (0.15) (0.82) (0.39) 
2.04 11.4 1.36 3.35 
(0.75) (O.lS) (0.S7) (0.40) 
Note: For the sum of the coefficients estimates, standard errors are in parenthesis. AlC = Akaike Information Criterion and SBIC = Schwarz Bayesian Information 
Criterion. BL(S) = Box and Ljung test for correlation up to Sth order. ARCH(4) = Engle test for ARCH effects up to 4th-order (p-values for those tests are in. 
parentheses). The estimates are obtained from a V AR including a constant, seasonal dummies, the first differences of the EU(l5) unemployment rate and lagged 
first differences of the EU(l5) inflation rate. 
Horizon 
1 
4 
8 
12 
16 
00 
TABLE 2 
THE ROLE OF DEMAND SHOCKS IN VARIANCE DECOMPOSITIONS 
( 1964-1995) 
(A = -0.25) (A = -0.12) (A = 0) 
KEYNESIAN MODEL MONET ARlST MODEL RBC MODEL 
u 1t u re u 1t 
100.00 11.00 15.32 89.98 0.000 93.03 
99.7 11.78 13.69 87.93 0.004 57.59 
98.9 12.13 13.93 88.36 0.003 57.75 
98.8 12.17 13.94 88.50 0.003 57.66 
98.8 12.17 13.94 88.53 0.004 57.65 
98.8 12.17 13.94 88.53 0.003 57.64 
Note: The figures represent percentage points. 
TABLE 3 
SACRIFICE RATIOS (SR) FOR A 1 PERCENTAGE POINT 
PERMANENT REDUCTION IN INFLATION RATE 
(Full sample: 1964-1995) 
KEYNESIAN MODEL 
Horizon 
u 1t SR 
1 0.22 -0.85 0.22 
4 0.35 -1.35 0.35 
8 0.49 -0.90 0.84 
12 0.54 -1.03 1.38 
16 0.57 -1.01 1.95 
.. .. 
00 0.59 -1.00 .. 2.54 
MONETARIST MODEL 
Horizon 
u 1t SR 
1 0.11 -0.96 0.11 
4 0.18 -1.31 0.18 
8 0.25 -0.88 0.43 
12 0.28 -1.03 0.71 
16 0.29 -0.98 1.00 
00 0.30 -1.00 1.30 
RBC MODEL 
Horizon 
u 1t SR 
1 
-0.02 -1.10 -0.02 
4 
-0.03 
-0.98 -0.03 
8 -0.03 -1.01 -0.06 
12 
-0.03 
-0.99 -0.09 
16 
-0.03 
-1.00 -0.12 
00 
-0.03 -1.00 -0.15 
••••••••••••••••••••• 
TABLE 4 
SACRIFICE RATIOS FOR A 1 P.P. PERMANENT REDUCTION 
IN INFLATION RAT~ 
(TRIVARIATE MODEL) 
u SR 
Horizon 
4 1.10 1.10 
8 0.80 l.90 
12 0.52 2.42 
16 0.10 2.52 
00 0.04 2.56 
(2.50. 3.25) 
Note: Bootstrap 90% confidence interval in parenthesis. 
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